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Having myself taken part in what was billed as a “con-ver sa tion” with Peter Singer in Melbourne’s Anglican Cathedral some months ago, I strongly endorse Charles 
Camosy’s far more ambitious effort to go “beyond polarization” 
with his discussion of Singer’s ethical philosophy. Frequently 
referred to in the book is the May 2011 “Christian Ethics Engages 
Peter Singer” conference held in Oxford where both Singer and 
Camosy gave the opening addresses. Camosy underlines that Singer 
has shown he is prepared to work with Christians in the areas of 
poverty, the ecology, and animals, and refers to Pope Benedict’s 
recommendation in Caritas in Veritate of “fraternal collaboration” 
with all, believers and non- believers, for the achievement of their 
common goals of peace and justice. 
In his Introduction, Camosy frankly notes that Singer’s “basic 
project claims to be one designed to undermine the foundations” 
supporting the Christian view of the world (3). His biographi-
cal sketch reveals a long rabbinical line in Singer’s family, with 
the tragic loss of three of his four grandparents in the Holocaust. 
Singer’s parents escaped from Vienna, migrating to Australia 
where he grew up. Though he attended a Presbyterian high school, 
at Melbourne University he joined the Rationalist Society, with 
his principal motive for rejecting God’s existence expressed in 
his question, “How could the kind of god Christians describe—
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent—have allowed 
something like the Holocaust to take place?” (5). Since his under-
graduate days, Singer has been an activist—against the Vietnam 
War, for abortion, and later for animal rights. 
Rather than seeing Singer’s ethical views as an insurmountable 
barrier to dialogue, Camosy approvingly quotes a fellow Catholic 
ethicist, David Hollenbach, SJ: “Differences of vision are not so 
total that we are destined to remain eternal strangers to one an-
other” (7). He reminds the reader that Aquinas “spent his entire 
career in intellectual solidarity with the thought of the pagan phi-
losopher Aristotle” (8). Camosy’s method in his discussion of the 
topics of abortion, euthanasia, our treatment of animals, duties to 
the poor, and ethical method, will map out in relation to Singer the 
areas of significant agreement, “the surprisingly narrow disagree-
ment,” and how Singer and the church should “push each other” 
regarding those narrow areas of disagreement (8). 
In Chapter One, Abortion, Camosy notes that “both Peter 
Singer and the Roman Catholic Church believe that Roe v Wade 
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is bad law and both would prefer a legislative approach to the cur-
rent public policy” (16). Also, “Singer acknowledges, quite plainly, 
that his arguments about the moral status of the fetus also apply 
to the newborn baby” (18). Obviously while the church has simi-
larly seen the link between abortion and infanticide, it has drawn 
completely different moral conclusions (19). However, in order to 
effect an agreement with Singer, who distinguishes between being 
a member of the species Homo sapiens and being a human person, 
Camosy seems to overstretch his reading both of John Paul  II’s 
Evangelium Vitae and of the 2008 Vatican document, Dignitas 
Personae. Since he refers to the latter document as confirmation 
that the church does not “commit itself to the position that the 
embryo has a rational soul” (24), it does no harm to see what Dig-
nitas Personae actually says: 
Although the presence of the spiritual soul cannot be ob-
served experimentally, the conclusions of science regarding 
the human embryo give “a valuable indication for discern-
ing by the use of reason a personal presence at the moment 
of the first appearance of a human life: how could a human 
individual not be a human person?” Indeed, the reality of the 
human being for the entire span of life, both before and after 
birth, does not allow us to posit either a change in nature or 
a gradation in moral value, since it possesses full anthropo-
logical and ethical status. The human embryo has, therefore, 
from the very beginning, the dignity proper to a person 
(n. 5).
Camosy rightly finds that both Singer and the church “disagree 
about the moral value of the potential of the fetus” (27). Camosy 
defends the personhood of the unborn human on the basis of “the 
metaphysical distinction that Aristotle and Reichlin make be-
tween active and passive potential” (37). He sees human beings as 
possessed of an active potential to rationality and self- awareness. 
These are “essentially present in our natures as the kinds of things 
we are” (39). Despite this crucial disagreement, Camosy points out 
that:
Singer has now realized that many of his claims about prac-
tical ethics cannot be justified without a fairly strong appeal 
to metaphysics—with the result that he is now rethinking 
fundamental aspects of his moral theory (40). 
So, along with Singer’s “suspicion of the kind of hyper- autonomy 
and consumerism which drives the broad support for abortion 
rights,” Camosy considers Singer may rethink his approach to 
abortion (40).
In Chapter Two, Euthanasia, Camosy notes how Singer and 
the church:
share skepticism about whether we should use a brain- 
death criterion for determining when a human organism 
has died. . . . Remarkably, they also share several conclu-
sions about when one is morally justified in removing life- 
sustaining treatment, and even when one is justified in using 
pain medication, which will hasten a patient’s death (43). 
There is no difficulty in finding agreement with Singer on not 
being required to use what the church regards as extraordinary 
means to prolong life (57–61), but the church does insist on what 
it calls “ordinary means”—the administration of food and water 
(whether by natural or artificial means) for those in the so- called 
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“persistent vegetative state” (63). Still, Camosy quotes a 2009 re-
sponse of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith that notes: 
“in remote places or in situations of extreme poverty, the artificial 
provision of food and water may be physically impossible;” or “a 
patient may be unable to assimilate food and drink;” or “[artifi-
cial provision] may be excessively burdensome for the patient or 
may cause significant physical discomfort . . .” (64). Despite these 
careful qualifications, Camosy’s conclusion perhaps goes too far in 
light of the much less qualified interpretations it could lead to: “So 
let us be absolutely clear: the Church claims, along with Singer, 
that it may be licit to remove patient B’s feeding tube” (65). The 
question has to do with the word “may.” Indeed, there follows an 
excellent discussion, based on recent practice in the Netherlands 
and Oregon, that convincingly argues against Singer’s denial that 
permitting euthanasia leads to a “slippery slope” from voluntary to 
involuntary euthanasia (68–79).
The next chapter, Non- human animals, includes Singer’s de-
scription of the horrendous treatment of animals by factory farms, 
along with the consequent recommendation by Camosy that we 
altogether abstain from any meat produced from them. Despite 
some differences with Singer’s reading of the Christian tradition, 
Camosy shows how various Catholic writers today fully agree with 
Singer on respect for non- human animals. However, his attempt 
to ground the ethical treatment of animals might need a sharper 
focus. For example, there is his statement that what “non- human 
animals share with human animals, for Thomas Aquinas, is a spiri-
tual reality or soul” (112). In the Aristotelian tradition, “soul” is a 
principle of vegetative life in plants, of sensitive life in animals, but 
only humans have the capacity for intellectual (or spiritual) life. His 
listing of capacities animals share with humans—consciousness, 
rationality, self- awareness, third- order reflection, empathy, and 
morality (125–26) is a heterogeneous one. Animals are by defi-
nition conscious and capable of empathy, but the other four ca-
pacities would, I suggest, require radical re- definition if ascribed to 
animals. Consequently, not every reader will agree when he says “I 
can find no reason to deny to many of them [non- human animals] 
a moral status similar to that of human persons” (132). However, 
such a conclusion is not necessary for a Catholic to fully adhere 
to Camosy’s final conclusions on abstaining from factory farmed 
food products and his call for explicit church teaching on the sin-
fulness of cruelty to animals (135).
Camosy shows in his next chapter, Duties to the Poor, that de-
spite differences, Singer and the church are broadly and strongly 
in agreement: “both approaches react strongly against the violence 
and injustice that our consumerist and hyper- autonomous culture 
inflicts on the vulnerable poor” (176). Then in Chapter Five, Ethi-
cal Theory, he wishes to establish common ground between the 
church’s moral teaching, which holds certain actions to be intrin-
sically evil, and Singer’s “preference utilitarianism,” which would 
include a consideration of the consequences of various actions 
before judging them good or evil. In a section on “A Common 
Consequentialist Approach” Camosy quotes John Paul II’s Verita-
tis Splendor which affirms the teleological character of the moral 
life (187). A key statement in that encyclical rejects “the thesis, 
characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories” that it is 
impossible to qualify as morally evil certain behavior “apart from a 
consideration of the intention” of the agent. 
Camosy’s discussion of this point seems to rely on a re- definition 
of “teleological” to include the kind of intention that goes beyond 
the act to its consequences (204). A problem I would have with 
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this notion is that it does not differentiate between a teleology 
whose meaning is determined by further considerations beyond 
the act itself, and a teleology whose goal occurs in a present mo-
ment that is simultaneously before eternity—in the sense of Der-
rida’s famous remark that “deconstruction is Justice.”1 The reason 
nothing can excuse evil acts like abortion or euthanasia is that the 
moment they are committed they are already a lethally grave of-
fence to another human being, whose dignity is rooted in his or 
her orientation towards divine reality beyond space and time. And 
the author’s reworking of the notion of the value of human life, 
treating it as of irreducible rather than infinite value (212), is not 
the only time in reading Camosy that I felt Singer could have been 
invited to move beyond analytic philosophy to consider the work 
of philosophers like Emmanuel Levinas, Jean- Luc Marion and 
Jacques Derrida. For example, Levinas’ Totality and Infinity, in the 
light of the Holocaust, is best seen as a reaffirmation of the infinite 
worth of each single human being. 
Many readers will find Camosy’s last chapter, Singer’s Shift?, a 
real surprise. He mentions how Oxford moral philosopher Derek 
Parfit “has apparently convinced Singer to become more open to 
objectivity in his moral theory” (215). Singer’s recent writings es-
pouse an ethics that “takes a universal point of view” (216). Rather 
than a metaphysical top- down approach, Camosy gives an excel-
lent summary of Jean Porter’s Thomistic view of human nature 
from the ground up (226–30), which he convincingly suggests 
would be acceptable to Singer’s present state in the development of 
his moral thinking. Camosy shows how Porter’s view of objective 
1. Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’ ” in: Acts of 
Religion (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 243.
human flourishing and Singer’s new views are close to coinciding. 
For Singer, Camosy writes, “Happiness comes when we transcend 
our inward- looking concerns and instead identify ourselves with 
‘the most objective point of view possible’: the point of view of the 
universe” (233).
Camosy’s Conclusion suggests that Singer’s ethics should help 
push the church to acknowledge the value of all life, human and 
non- human, to have a presumption against violence and death 
(though given Singer’s constantly stated views on abortion and eu-
thanasia this might seem unconvincing), and have a presumption 
for aiding those in need, those dying without aid, and the most 
vulnerable, including animals (246). Christian ethics should push 
Singer to clarify his recent move towards an objective ethics and 
to include a consideration of sexual ethics, given its importance in 
human existence and the generation of children (247–49).
The common ground Camosy foresees Singer and the church 
moving together on is their shared critique of the self- centered 
individualist over against an other- centered lifestyle (251). Camosy 
has already mentioned collaboration in the eradication of “abso-
lute poverty” and expresses the hope for a rethink on abortion and 
euthanasia from Singer and his followers (252). So the question is: 
Has Camosy succeeded in moving the debate with Singer “beyond 
polarization”? While I have expressed differences with some of his 
analyses, the generosity of his approach provides a model for dia-
logue which by that very attempt already moves the ethical debate 
to the most basic of all contexts, where we respect one another’s 
views, and are able to learn both from the perceived strengths and 
limits of the other as well as from the strengths and limits the 
other may discover in us. 
